China's Trade Agreements: RCEP, Bilateral FTAs, WTO and the Belt and Road

China joined the World Trade Organization on 11 December 2001 after fifteen years of negotiation, committing to bound tariffs, national treatment, the opening of services sectors and the phase-out of most trade-distorting subsidies. The most-favoured-nation rates that apply to the bulk of China's imports today, the tariff-rate quotas on grains and cotton, and the dispute-settlement cases between China and its partners all rest on that accession. Two questions from the accession still shape trade politics: whether China is treated as a market economy in anti-dumping cases (the EU and the US say no; the relevant accession clause expired in 2016), and whether the subsidies and state-owned-enterprise disciplines are adequate — the origin of the tariff actions since 2018 taken outside the WTO framework.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership brings together China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the ten ASEAN states — about 30 % of the world's population and output — in one agreement in force since 1 January 2022. It phases out tariffs on some 90 % of goods traded between members over up to twenty years, with different schedules for different partner pairs; it is the first trade agreement between China and Japan and between Japan and South Korea. Its practical innovation is the single set of rules of origin with regional cumulation: inputs from any member count as originating, so a product assembled in Vietnam from Chinese, Korean and Japanese parts qualifies for RCEP rates across the bloc. Origin is proven by a certificate of origin issued by the exporting country's authority or, for approved exporters, a declaration on the invoice.

For China's exporters RCEP mainly lowered duties into Japan and, over time, Korea; for importers into China it lowered duties on Japanese and Korean intermediate goods and ASEAN agricultural products. Because China already had FTAs with ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand and Korea, the ASEAN–China agreement often gives a lower rate than RCEP for the same goods — the importer chooses whichever agreement gives the best rate and whose origin rule the goods meet.

China's Ministry of Commerce lists agreements in force with ASEAN (2005, upgraded 2019 and again in the 3.0 protocol signed 2025), Chile (2006), Pakistan (2007), New Zealand (2008, upgraded 2022), Singapore (2009, upgraded 2019), Peru (2010, upgraded 2024), Costa Rica (2011), Iceland (2014), Switzerland (2014), South Korea (2015), Australia (2015), Georgia (2018), Mauritius (2021), Cambodia (2022), Nicaragua (2024), Serbia (2024), Ecuador (2024) and Honduras (2025), plus the closer economic partnership arrangements with Hong Kong and Macao, the preferential agreement with Maldives (2025) and framework agreements under negotiation with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Norway and others. Each has its own product schedules, rules of origin and certificate format; the conventional rate on China's tariff is claimed with the certificate on the import declaration.

The agreements matter differently by sector: the Australia agreement removed most duties on Australian wine, beef, dairy and resources into China; the Switzerland agreement gives Swiss watches and machinery preferential entry; the Korea agreement covers a large share of the components trade; the Serbia and Ecuador agreements are recent examples of China pairing FTAs with Belt and Road investment.

A preferential rate is only available if the goods meet the agreement's rule of origin — usually a change of tariff classification, a regional value content threshold (often 40 %), or a specified process — and the importer presents proof at declaration. In China the proof is a certificate of origin issued by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade or customs for exports, and the partner country's designated body for imports, or an approved-exporter origin declaration under agreements that allow it (RCEP, Switzerland, Iceland, New Zealand and others). Certificates are issued per shipment, before or shortly after export, and can be applied for retroactively within a year under most agreements. A certificate with a wrong HS code, an inconsistent invoice number or a missing signature is refused, and the MFN rate applies.

Launched in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative is not a trade agreement but a framework of infrastructure finance, investment and cooperation memoranda with more than 150 countries. Its trade effects are indirect but large: Chinese-built ports, railways and industrial parks in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, the Gulf and Latin America carry Chinese exports and Chinese-invested production, and trade with partner countries reached 23.6 trillion yuan in 2025, 51.9 % of China's total, according to the General Administration of Customs. The China–Europe Railway Express, the Kazakhstan and Laos rail links, Gwadar, Piraeus and the East African ports are the physical side; the trade agreements above are the legal side.

China applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership on 16 September 2021 and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement of Singapore, New Zealand and Chile in November 2021. CPTPP accession would require commitments on state-owned enterprises, labour, data flows and subsidies well beyond RCEP; the members have not opened formal negotiations, and the application is a statement of direction rather than an imminent change in tariffs.

Before quoting or ordering, check the tariff line in both directions under each applicable agreement, decide which agreement's origin rule the goods can meet, and price the certificate of origin into the transaction. For a European buyer of Chinese goods there is no preferential agreement — the EU and China have none — so the MFN rate applies and anti-dumping duties by product are the variable to check. For an Australian, Swiss, Korean, ASEAN or RCEP-member counterparty, the conventional rate can be the difference between a competitive and an uncompetitive landed cost.